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WILLS AND ESTATES
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS

Texas. In Heinatz v"Allen' testatrix devised to her daughter
"the surface rights exclusive of the mineral rights" and to trustees for all of her children "the mineral rights" in some 400
acres of land. Petitioner, who claimed under the trustees, recovered judgment in the trial court against the respondents, who
claimed under the daughter for the title and possession of the
mineral rights and estate in the land "including commercial limestone and building stone." Monetary damages for limestone already taken from the land were also allowed, as well as an injunction restraining respondents from quarrying or removing any
commercial limestone or building stone. The court of civil appeals
reversed, holding that commercial limestone was not included in
the devise of "the mineral rights." The Texas Supreme Court
affirmed, saying that it did not understand the opinion of the
court of civil appeals to be based in part upon evidence as to
circumstances attending the execution of the will or as to what
the testatrix might have had in mind. It did understand the civil
appeals court to hold as a matter of law, from the terms of the
will itself and without looking to evidence as to the surrounding
circumstances, that the devise of "the mineral rights" did not
include commercial limestone. The supreme court said that, in
view of the simple and plain terms of the will, the intention of the
testatrix as to what was devised is to be ascertained without aid
from evidence as to the attending circumstances.
The crucial question in the case was whether commercial limestone was included in the devise of "the mineral rights" in the
tract of land. In deciding this question the court said,
"We must look to the evidence as to the nature of the limestone, its
relation to the surface of the land, its use and value, and the method
'
and effect of its removal.1 2
217 S. W. 2d. 994 (1949).
Tex.-,
12 217 S. W. 2d. at 995. 996.
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The court disposed of the cases and reference material such
as histories, encyclopedias and almanacs, cited by the petitioners
as being authority for including limestone in the term "minerals"
as being instances where the term "minerals" was used in its scientific or technical meaning. It said that in such a sense sand and
gravel are classified as minerals or mineral resources. After reviewing the geological aspects of the land, the court concluded
that the limestone on the land having value only for building purposes, underlying most, if not all, of the land at varying and
usually shallow depths, outcropping in all of the ravines, and
removed by quarrying, is so closely related to the soil that it is
reasonably and ordinarily considered a part of the soil and as
belonging to the surface estate rather than as a part of the minerals
or mineral rights. The court bolstered its argument by adverting
to the fact that the limestone was only recoverable by quarrying
(open pit method), which destroys the surface for agricultural
and grazing purposes.
It is submitted that the decision in the case is very clear and
is in accord with the well established principle that the intent of
the testator is the paramount consideration in construing wills.
Where there is no indication in a will that particular words are
used in their scientific or technical sense, their ordinary and natural
meaning will be given them.
The case is probably unique in that a search of the digests reveals no other wills case exactly in point, but the cases are numerous involving deeds which are in accord.3
CONTINGENT OR CONDITIONAL WILL

Texas. In Bagnall v. Bagnall' the deceased left a will as
follows:
8
Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S. E. 629 (1928); Kinder v. LaSalle County
Carbon Coal Co., 310 I1. 126, 141 N. E. 537 (1923) ; Campbell Y.Tennessee Coal, Iron
and R. Co, 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S. W. 674 (1924) ; Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97
S. W. 2d. 35 (1936); see 1 A.L.R. 2d. 787, 795 (1948); 86 A.L.R. 986 (1933); 17
A.LR. 161 (1922).
'4-Tex.-,
225 S. W. 2d. 401 (1949).
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"Oct. 5, 1929
Remember me W. W. Bagnall by this. If anything happens to me.
While gone. All my belongings and estate goes to James B. Bagnall
Brother of mine.
W. W. Bagnall
Oct. 5, 1929"

The deceased did not die until 1947, and another brother attacked the will on the ground that it was a contingent or conditional
will. At the conclusion of testimony in the district court, the case
was taken from' the jury and judgment was rendered denying
probate. The court of civil appeals reversed and held that the
instrument was entitled to probate. In a split decision (Justices
Griffin and Garwood dissenting) the Texas Supreme Court reversed
the court of civil appeals and reinstated the judgment of the district court. The court said that the principles of law were not in
dispute and that the sole question for determination was the construction of the terms of the instrument. The generally accepted
definition of a "contingent will" as one which is intended to take
effect only on the happening of a specified contingency was stated.
The court said that if the language used makes a will contingent
and the contingency does not happen, then it is not entitled to probate; but if the language used merely shows an inducement or
motive, then upon the testator's death the will is entitled to probate even though such event has not taken place.
The dissent argued that a will should be construed as a general
will unless the contrary clearly appears; that if the event mentioned merely indicates inducement and the testator's intent to
make it contingent is not apparent, then it is entitled to probate;
that if a will is equally capable of two constructions, the one upholding validity is preferred; that the fact that a testator left a
will implies that he did not intend to die intestate; and that the
authorities cited by the majority were cases where the condition
was plainly and clearly expressed on the face of the will.
While the case establishes no new principle of law, it demonstrates how widely the courts may differ in applying a well settled
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principle. The fact that the probate and district courts held one
way, the court of civil appeals reversed, and the supreme court
reinstated the finding of the lower courts but with two dissenting
justices, shows that Texas courts are no different from other jurisdictions. Atkinson5 states that the cases are irreconcilable and
that with respect to the same or similar language there is as much
authority on one side as on the other.
DOWER-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Arkansas. In Maloney v. McCullough' three children, appellees,
sued the widow of a fourth child, appellant, to quiet title to a tract
of land which had been the family homestead. The father owned
and occupied the tract as his homestead until his death in 1940.
The widow then occupied it as her homestead until 1948, when
she died. None of the children, who were all of age at the time
of their father's death, occupied the land after the death of their
father and prior to the death of their mother.
Appellant, whose husband died intestate and without issue in
1945, claimed dower rights under Arkansas Statutes 1947, Sec.
tion 61-206:
"If a husband dies, leaving a wife and no children, such widow shall
be endowed in fee simple of one-half the real estate of which such husband died seized, where said estate is a new acquisition and not an
ancestral estate; and one-half of the personal estate, absolutely and in
her own right, as against collateral heirs; but as against creditors, she
shall be endowed with one-third of the real estate in fee simple if a
new acquisition and not ancestral, and of one-third of the personal
property absolutely, provided, if the real estate of the husband be an
anestral estate she shall be endowed in a life estate of one-half of said
estate as against collateral heirs, and one-third as against creditors."

1ield.,

the judgment of the trial court denying appellant any
interest should be affirmed. The court said that the dower statutes
had been construerd by prior decisions and that the construction
,5ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS (1937)
221 S. W. 2d. 770 (1949).
Ark.
*6
*

§ 150.
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given them was that the legislature did not intend to give the
widow an estate in her deceased husband's lands essentially different from the estate of dower known at common law, except as
therein expressly provided. At common law it was essential that
the husband should have been seised and in possession during
coverture in order to entitle his widow to dower in his lands. Where
there is a life tenant and the husband has only a remainder or
reversion in the land, the seisin is in the life tenant; therefore,
dower does not attach to realty in which the husband has only an
interest in remainder or reversion, unless the particular estate
terminates during coverture.
Appellant argued that homestead and dower are not regarded
as estates and that her husband took a vested remainder in the
lands upon the death of his father and that said vested interest
descended to his heirs upon his death. The court answered that
the homestead interest involved was of the type that the widow
and minor children had in their deceased husband's and father's
homestead, or the minor children's interest in the deceased mother's homestead. By the Arkansas Constitution such homestead interest is given to the widow for life without any restrictions, and
the Constitution vests in the widow an estate for her life and in
the children during their minority. In the case at bar the mother
exercised her homestead right in the lands until her death, which
occurred after the death of her son; therefore, the son, husband
of appellant, never had possession or any present right of possession, and was never seized of an estate of inheritance in the land
during coverture.
ORAL CONTRACT TO WILL-SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE AND CONSIDERATION

Arkansas. In Offord v. Agnew1 the deceased owned three lots
and dwelling houses. She resided in one of the houses and rented
the others. On the death of the deceased a contest arose between
appellant, deceased's half-brother, her only heir at law, and
?

Ark.-

, 218 S. W. 2d. 370 (1949).
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appellee, the sister of her deceased husband, as to who was entitled to the property. Appellant claimed by intestacy, and appellee claimed by virtue of an oral contract with deceased whereby
the deceased promised to will the property to appellee. The evidence showed that, after the deceased's husband (brother of appellee) had died, appellee for a time resided with the deceased
and from time to time had paid small grocery bills, and in one
instance had advanced part of the fire insurance premium on
the dwellings at the request of the deceased. There was testimony
that the deceased was not on friendly terms with the appellant
and that she had made statements that she had talked with several
people about willing the property to appellee and that she had
done so. There was also testimony that the deceased had said
that the appellee had been worrying her about making a will to
the property but that she was not going to because she might
have to will it to someone to take care of her. The trial court
found a valid oral contract to execute a will, that it was fully
performed by the appellee, and that title to the three lots should
be vested in the appellee.
In reversing the trial court the Supreme Court of Arkansas
held that the evidence was insufficient to support the decree. Quoting from a previous decision' the court said, "It has long been
the rule in this court that a valid oral contract to make a will or
a deed to land may be made, but that the testimony to establish
such a contract must be clear, cogent, satisfactory and convincing."' And quoting from Kranz v. Kranz10 the court stated that
a preponderance of the evidence was insufficient and that the
contract must be established by evidence so clear, satisfactory
and convincing as to be substantially beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, the court said that the consideration required in this
situation was prospective in nature, rather than past. In the present case the deceased agreed to devise the property to appellee
5

Crowefl v. Parker, 209 Ark. 803, 193 S. W. 2d. 483, 484 (1946).

p 2 18

S.W. 2d. at 372.

o 203 Ark. 1147, 158 S. W. 2d. 926 (1942).
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in consideration of services that had already been performed by
appellee, and the latter was under no obligation to render future
services.
As the court points out, the principle seems well established in
Arkansas that a valid oral contract to will real property may be
made, provided the evidence requirement is satisfied. However,
the earliest case cited for the foregoing proposition" is one which
is not exactly in point, although the same underlying principle
was involved. In that case the Supreme Court of Arkansas enforced, in part, an oral contract concerning real property between
living persons on the now well settled principle that part performance plus improvements takes the contract out of the Statute
of Frauds. It was not until 1912 in Naylor v. Sheltonx" (which
did not cite Hinkle v. Hinkle) that the question was more clearly
raised, and in that case a will or deed was actually executed before death, although it was later destroyed. However, in Fred v.
Asbury"3 (where Hinkle v. Hinkle was cited) and in Williams v.
Williams14 the question was squarely presented, and an exact
holding on the point was made. It would seem, therefore, that
the Arkansas rule in wills cases is merely an outgrowth of the
part performance plus improvement test so prevalent in oral
contracts concerning land.
The earlier cases were situations where the deceased promised
to will or convey at death in consideration for personal services
rendered by the plaintiff, and the later cases seem to have added
the strict evidence requirement (greater than a preponderance)
to prevent fraud, just as the part performance plus improvements
requirement is a safeguard against fraud in contracts between
living persons.
Sam E. Daugherty.
11 Hinkle v. Hinkle, 55 Ark. 583, 18 S. W. 1049 (1892).
12 102 Ark. 30, 143 S. W. 117 (1912).
13 105 Ark. 494, 152 S. W. 155 (1912).
14 128 Ark. 1, 193 S. W. 82 (1917).

